Месечни архиви: July 2018

Women entrepreneurs [What Europe does for you]

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for women entrepreneurs.

If you are a self-employed woman seeking support to launch your own company, you may be interested to know that the EU is encouraging women to start up in business and lending a helping hand.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

As women represent only a third of Europe’s self-employed workforce, the EU has tried to identify the obstacles that can make starting and growing a business more difficult for them, including lack of access to information, training, funding, mentors and support networks – not to mention difficulties balancing work and family life.

The EU has created the ‘WEgate-platform’, an online gateway with practical advice on how to start up and grow a business and access funding, e-learning materials, networking opportunities and details of local support organisations across Europe. It also finances the European Community of Business Angels, which helps women entrepreneurs to find funding, and cooperates with the WES policy network, which promotes female entrepreneurship at national level.

Thoughtful business woman documents in office

© Alliance / Fotolia

Under EU legislation, all self-employed women are entitled to a maternity allowance and to leave of at least 14 weeks, if they choose to take it. Additional flexible working arrangements in the EU’s new proposal for a work-life balance directive will hopefully enable more women to take part in the labour market as well in business activities.

Lastly, if you have received EU research and innovation funding at some point in your career, and founded or co-founded a successful company based on your innovative ideas, you could receive one of the annual cash prizes awarded as part of the EU Prize for Women Innovators.

Further information

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/14/women-entrepreneurs-what-europe-does-for-you/

Young Entrepreneurs [What Europe does for you]

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for young Entrepreneurs.

Have you always wanted to be your own boss? You are not alone: around 44 % of young Europeans would like to set up their own business. Reality paints a different picture however: in 2011, only 4 % of 15-24 year-olds were self-employed. A lack of skills and funding are what usually get in the way.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

The EU promotes young entrepreneurs in many ways. In 2009, the EU launched ‘Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs’. The idea is that new entrepreneurs learn from experienced entrepreneurs in another EU country. They gain the valuable skills they need to start their own business, while the EU offers financial and practical support. In the first five years of the programme, 2 500 exchanges took place involving 5 000 new and experienced entrepreneurs.

Geschäftsmann mit Jetpack auf dem Rücken

© lassedesignen / Fotolia

Another source of financial support for the would-be self-employed is the European Social Fund (ESF). For several years now, the ESF has been opening up learning and training opportunities and helping young business starters gain valuable skills and experience. One success story is the COPIE project – a network with partner organisations in five countries that works to make it easier for people from disadvantaged and under-represented backgrounds to set up in business. Meanwhile, as many aspiring entrepreneurs face financial difficulties in the start-up phase, the European Progress Microfinance facility can help improve access to microcredits.

Further information

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/14/young-entrepreneurs-what-europe-does-for-you/

The EU-UK withdrawal agreement: Progress to date and remaining difficulties

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, Laura Tilindyte and Sidonia Mazur,

The EU flag and the UK outlines with nation flag inside. United Kingdom withdrawal from the European Union. Brexit concept

© Elena Abrazhevich / Fotolia

With less than one year to go before the planned Brexit date of 30 March 2019, talks are continuing as regards the terms of the United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Beginning in June 2017, the withdrawal negotiations have focussed on three key priority issues – citizens’ rights, the financial settlement and the situation of Northern Ireland – alongside other ‘separation’ provisions (e.g. ongoing EU judicial and administrative procedures, Euratom related issues, data protection etc.). In addition, in December 2017, the European Council decided to begin negotiations on the terms of a transitional period as requested by the UK government.

On 19 March 2018, EU and UK negotiators announced that significant progress had been achieved regarding the draft withdrawal agreement: more than 75 % of the legal text had been settled, based on previous commitments undertaken by both sides in a joint report in December 2017. In particular, in the draft withdrawal agreement negotiators settled two of the priority issues in their entirety – citizens’ rights and the financial settlement; and importantly also approved the proposed transitional arrangements – to cover a 21-month period following the UK’s date of withdrawal from the EU until 31 December 2020. Furthermore, as regards the future governance of the agreement, it was agreed that a Joint Committee made up of an equal number of UK and EU representatives would assume responsibility for the implementation and application of the agreement. A few days later, the European Council (EU-27) welcomed this advance in the talks, which opened the door to discussions on defining the future framework of EU-UK relations, in accordance with the newly adopted European Council guidelines.

Despite these important steps towards reaching a withdrawal deal, divergences persist, particularly as regards two important elements: firstly, the jurisdiction and powers of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) as regards the interpretation and application of the agreement, as part of the dispute settlement process; secondly the issue of the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland after Brexit. The EU and UK agreed in principle that the Protocol on Northern Ireland/Ireland annexed to the draft agreement should include a default scenario, or backstop option, that would apply to the territory of Northern Ireland in the absence of any agreed solutions, with a view to avoiding the establishment of a hard border on the island of Ireland after Brexit. However, despite further talks in recent months the negotiators have yet to settle either of these issues, although some limited progress on other parts of the draft withdrawal agreement was announced in a joint statement on 19 June. The European Council meeting at the end of June welcomed this further progress from 19 June, but expressed its concern that no significant headway was achieved with regard to the backstop solution for Northern Ireland.

Negotiators are now aiming for October 2018 as the deadline for finalising the withdrawal deal, to allow time for the completion of approval procedures in the EU and the UK.

As part of these procedures, the European Parliament will have to give its consent to the deal. Having closely monitored the negotiations and provided input at every stage in the process, Parliament’s resolutions have particularly emphasised the importance of upholding citizens’ rights in the future deal, including throughout the transition period. Even with the part on citizens’ rights now agreed, Parliament will continue to monitor the negotiations and push for further rights to be included in the deal. As regards the remaining unresolved issues, Parliament has expressed support on several occasions for the Commission’s proposals.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘The EU-UK withdrawal agreement: Progress to date and remaining difficulties‘ in PDF on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of key events in the Brexit negotiations

Timeline of key events in the Brexit negotiations

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/13/the-eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement-progress-to-date-and-remaining-difficulties/

Limits on exposure to carcinogens and mutagens at work: Third proposal [EU Legislation in Progress]

Written by Nicole Scholz (1st edition),

Occupational Health written on the road

© gustavofrazao / Fotolia

The European Commission has proposed to amend Directive 2004/37/EC by expanding its scope and by including and/or revising occupational exposure limit values for a number of cancer- or mutation-causing substances. The initiative is proceeding in steps. The first proposal of May 2016 covered 13 priority chemical agents, the second, of January 2017, a further seven. The current (third) proposal addresses an additional five.

Broad discussions with scientists and the social partners fed into all three proposals. Reacting to the Commission’s set of measures as a whole, trade unions have acknowledged the importance of further action to improve the existing framework, reiterating the need to reach the target of 50 limit values in 2020, while some considered it necessary to extend the scope of the CMD to substances that are toxic to reproduction. Actors on the employers’ side, while in principle supporting further revisions of the directive, have underlined, among other things, the need to ensure that values are proportionate and feasible in terms of technical implementation.

While welcoming the Commission proposal, the rapporteur’s draft report of 29 June 2018 proposes, inter alia, to grant incentives to businesses that comply with the directive. Moreover, it opts to include, within the scope of the directive, the protection of workers from exposure to hazardous, or harm-causing, medicines (including cytotoxic ones, which are used in the treatment of cancer).


Stage: Committee vote

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/13/limits-on-exposure-to-carcinogens-and-mutagens-at-work-third-proposal-eu-legislation-in-progress/

Victims of terrorism [What Europe does for you]

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for victims of terrorism.

Every year Europe commemorates victims of terrorism on 11 March. This European Remembrance Day was established after the 2004 Madrid bombings, which left 191 people dead and around 2 000 injured. But Europe does not limit its action to commemoration. European legislation aimed specifically at combating terrorism dates back to 2002, and introduced a common understanding of terrorist offences and minimal penalties for perpetrators across Europe. It recognised the vulnerability of terrorism victims and the assistance they and their families need.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

Candles and flowers on the sidewalk to comemorate a famous dead person

© MoiraM / Fotolia

With the recent wave of attacks, which affected nine EU countries between 2015 and 2018, the European Union reinforced its arsenal to protect citizens and help victims. A law adopted in 2017 not only tightens the rules and sanctions related to terrorist activities, but also provides for better support for victims. Complementing earlier legislation on the rights of victims of crime, this law addresses victims’ needs, such as medical and psychological care or legal advice, and puts emergency mechanisms in place to assist them in the aftermath of an attack. Moreover, victims from another European country should receive the same assistance and compensation as residents of the country where the attack occurred, even when they return home. To ensure more efficient cooperation between countries, a Coordination Centre for Victims of Terrorism will open in 2019. An EU country faced with a terrorist attack can also ask for help under the EU solidarity clause and benefit from the crisis response arrangements involving political coordination.

Further information

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/13/victims-of-terrorism-what-europe-does-for-you/

Multiannual plan for fisheries in the Western Waters [EU Legislation in Progress]

Written by Irina Popescu (1st edition),

Bateaux de pêche dans la port du Conquet, Bretagne

© aterrom / Fotolia

On 23 March 2018, the European Commission proposed a multiannual plan for management of fisheries in a northeast Atlantic area along the western coast of the EU, known as the Western Waters. The plan covers fisheries exploiting stocks of fish and crustaceans living close to the sea bottom (i.e. ‘demersal fisheries’), and several deep-sea stocks. The proposed plan aims to ensure that stocks are exploited sustainably and that management is based on the most up-to-date scientific information. The EU fishing fleet concerned mainly includes vessels from Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

The proposal follows the pattern set by the recently adopted North Sea multiannual plan. It would allow a certain flexibility in setting fishing opportunities, by defining ranges of fishing mortality based on the best available scientific advice, and would introduce safeguard measures based on biomass levels, so as to restore stocks when they fall below safe biological limits. The plan would not include quantified values for fishing mortality or biomass levels. These are instead provided by the latest scientific advice available, and directly used by the Council when fixing fishing opportunities.


Stage: Committee vote

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/12/multiannual-plan-for-fisheries-in-the-western-waters-eu-legislation-in-progress/

EU-Japan trade agreement: a driver for closer cooperation beyond trade [International Agreements in Progress]

Written by Krisztina Binder, graphics: Giulio Sabbati,

EU trade with Japan

© chris / Fotolia

Negotiations on an EU-Japan trade agreement were officially launched in March 2013. Following the political agreement in principle reached in July 2017, a final accord on the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was announced in December 2017. On 18 April 2018, the European Commission proposed to the Council of the European Union to sign and conclude the agreement. The Commission expects that the EU-Japan EPA can be signed in July 2018, and aims to have the agreement come into effect before the end of its mandate in 2019, following approval by the Council and the European Parliament.

The EU-Japan EPA will establish a free trade area with a combined market of around 640 million consumers that accounts for roughly a third of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The 2016 Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (Trade SIA) of the agreement indicated that EU exports to Japan could rise by up to 34 %, and according to a more recent Commission estimate, European companies would save up to €1 billion in customs duties per year as a result of the EU-Japan EPA.

In addition to exploiting the untapped potential of bilateral trade, the agreement is also of strategic importance, conveying a strong message of the parties’ commitment to promoting a free and fair trading system based on rules, and to reject trade protectionism.

Read the complete briefing on ‘International Agreements in Progress – EU-Japan trade agreement: a driver for closer cooperation beyond trade‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/12/eu-japan-trade-agreement-a-driver-for-closer-cooperation-beyond-trade-international-agreements-in-progress/

Acquisition and loss of citizenship in EU Member States: Key trends and issues

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou and Costica Dumbrava,

Passport control entrance area for EU and other passport holders at Prague Airport, Czech Republic.

© Uskarp / Shutterstock

Access to citizenship status is an important prerequisite for enjoying rights and privileges, such as migration and political rights, as well as for developing a sense of identity and belonging. Since the establishment of Union citizenship, all persons who are nationals or citizens of an EU Member State enjoy the status of EU citizenship, which confers on them a number of additional rights and privileges. However, Member States retain full control over who can be recognised as a citizen.

Although the legal rules on the acquisition and loss of citizenship in the EU Member States remain fairly divergent, one can identify a number of key trends and issues. The need to integrate long-term immigrants has pushed EU countries to amend their citizenship laws. This often resulted in making citizenship both more liberal (lowering residence requirements and tolerating dual citizenship) and more restrictive (introducing integration clauses and citizenship tests). The surge in terrorist activities in the EU, which involve citizens, prompted several Member States to revise or reactivate citizenship provisions allowing for citizenship to be revoked.

Concerns about immigrants’ integration, allegiance and belonging, as well as about the cultural and economic consequences of regional integration and globalisation are at the heart of recent debates about citizenship in Europe. As the Maltese case of investor citizenship shows, the issue of access to citizenship is no longer a matter that concerns Member States alone. The bundling of national and EU citizenship means that Member States have a certain responsibility towards each other when taking decisions over who to accept (or reject) as citizens.

Read this briefing on ‘Acquisition and loss of citizenship in EU Member States: Key trends and issues‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/11/acquisition-and-loss-of-citizenship-in-eu-member-states-key-trends-and-issues/

Single-use plastics and fishing gear: Reducing marine litter [EU Legislation in Progress]

Written by Didier Bourguignon (1st edition),

Marine pollution: plastic waste on the beach.

© Arcansél / Fotolia

Most of the plastic in our oceans originates from land-based sources. On European beaches, plastics make up 80-85 % of marine litter, which is considered a major threat to marine and coastal biodiversity. Marine litter also costs the European Union economy an estimated €259 million to €695 million per year.

In May 2018, the European Commission put forward a legislative proposal seeking to address the issue of marine litter from plastics. The proposal would introduce a series of measures regarding the top 10 single-use plastics found on European beaches, as well as fishing gear, with a view to reducing their impact on the environment and ensuring a functional internal market.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is considering the proposal. The Environment Council discussed the proposal on 25 June 2018.


Marine litter on EU beaches, by count (2016)

Marine litter on EU beaches, by count (2016)

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/11/single-use-plastics-and-fishing-gear-reducing-marine-litter-eu-legislation-in-progress/

2018 NATO summit: A critical time for European defence

Written by Elena Lazarou,

NATO flag waving against clean blue sky, close up, isolated with clipping path mask alpha channel transparency

© railwayfx / Fotolia

On 11 and 12 July 2018 the NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Brussels for the 28th NATO summit. The summit comes at a time of tension in transatlantic relations, but also of continuing threats and challenges posed to the alliance. Against this background, leaders will focus on strengthening defence and deterrence, modernising the alliance and enhancing relations with the EU. Burden-sharing among allies is set to be one of the most controversial items on the agenda. In 2018 only eight out of twenty nine NATO members are estimated to be reaching the 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) defence spending target.

The Brussels summit aims to push forward the agenda, decisions and actions agreed upon at previous summits, notably in Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016). Yet there are fears that the insistence of US President Donald Trump that the focus be placed on burden sharing and demands that the NATO allies spend more on defence, might lead to the side-lining of other items on the agenda. The situation is aggravated by the current climate in transatlantic relations, which has deteriorated since the most recent G7 summit in Canada.

The summit in Brussels will also seek to secure progress on EU-NATO cooperation, aiming to produce a second joint statement, following that agreed upon in Warsaw in 2016. After two years of increased EU action to build up strategic autonomy in defence through initiatives such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund, cooperation with NATO is critical when it comes to taking European defence forward.


Defence expenditure estimates for 2017 (% GDP)

Defence expenditure estimates for 2017 (% GDP)

The 2018 NATO summit will take place in Brussels on 11 and 12 July 2018. The Heads of State and Government of the 29 members of the alliance are likely to reach a consensus on practical proposals on enhancing deterrence and responding to the ongoing political, security and economic challenges emanating from the east and south. Discussions on the future of the alliance, for instance on burden sharing and potential enlargement, will almost certainly prove more contentious.

Founded in 1949, NATO ‘remains committed to fulfilling its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security’. These are reflected in the six themes around which the Brussels summit has been organised, namely (1) strengthening deterrence and defence; (2) projecting stability and fighting terrorism; (3) enhancing the NATO- EU partnership; (4) modernising the alliance; (5) achieving fairer burden-sharing; and (6) shared values and transatlantic unity.

Following a meeting of NATO’s defence ministers in June, there is a fair expectation that some key deliverables will emerge from the summit. These include launching a new NATO readiness initiative, referred to as the ‘Four Thirties’ (capacity for 30 mechanised battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels to be ready within 30 days or less to counter possible aggression by 2020), and increasing the NATO command structure by 1 200 personnel and two new commands (for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and for military mobility in Ulm, Germany). Significant progress is also expected on NATO-EU relations, in the form of a new joint declaration between NATO’s secretary general and the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. Military mobility, a flagship area of EU-NATO cooperation, is meanwhile likely to figure prominently.

Progress in these areas will inevitably depend on achieving a climate of unity among allies from the two sides of the Atlantic. Diverging positions between the EU and the US on issues such as the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and potentially Russia, as well as issues beyond security, such as trade and tariffs, have raised concerns in this regard. Moreover, the expected tension over the item of burden-sharing among NATO members, particularly following the issuing of letters from President Trump to several NATO member leaders, urging them to spend more on defence, has done little to improve the climate. In 2018, just eight out of twenty-nine NATO members are estimated to be reaching the 2 % of GDP defence spending target agreed upon in 2014 as a pledge with a view to 2024.


Since the first NATO summit in Paris in 1957, 27 summits have taken place at key junctures in the history of the alliance. Decisions taken at summits are issued in the form of declarations and communiqués and then translated into action by the relevant actors, namely the North Atlantic Council’s subordinate committees and NATO’s command structure, which cover the whole range of functions and activities of the alliance. NATO summits are normally attended only by member countries, but occasionally convene in different formats, including, for example, meetings of defence or foreign ministers, Heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. They can also include leaders from countries contributing troops to a NATO-led operation or high-level representatives from international organisations such as the UN.

Deteriorating security, globally and on Europe’s periphery, led to two landmark summits being held in 2014 and 2016. The 2014 NATO Wales summit was marked by the Ukraine crisis, growing instability in the southern neighbourhood and rising transnational threats, for instance from ISIL/Da’esh. Allied leaders had been expected to focus on NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, but Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine shifted their focus. NATO leaders returned to the fundamental debate over NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, its deterrence and defence posture, and its core purpose: collective defence as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Many of the same issues were on the Warsaw agenda in 2016 but additional challenges to Euro-Atlantic security included rising terrorism and unprecedented migrant and refugee flows. A major outcome of the summit was the agreement to intensify NATO’s deterrence posture by increasing the alliance’s military presence in the east. First steps included deploying multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In the Middle East, allies pledged to make further capacity-building efforts in Iraq, to support the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL by deploying surveillance aircraft to gather intelligence, and to maintain Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan beyond 2016. A decision was also made to expand NATO’s presence in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in cooperation with EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia). An important outcome of the summit was the EU-NATO joint declaration which outlined areas for enhanced cooperation, including countering hybrid threats, stepping up operational cooperation at sea and on migration, coordinating cyber-security and defence, developing the interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and alliance members, strengthening the defence industry, increasing coordination on exercises and building up the defence and security capacity of partners in the east and south. The range of decisions made at the Warsaw summit reflected the division of interests and priorities within the alliance. At the 2016 summit leaders adopted the ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’ (EFP) in Poland and the Baltic States and the ‘Tailored Forward Presence’ (TFP) in the Black Sea region.

Issues to watch and stakeholder views

Within the context of the summit’s official agenda, experts analysing and forecasting the outcomes of the leaders’ encounter have been focusing on the following specific themes:

Transatlantic relations and burden sharing

This will be President Trump’s first official NATO summit. The summits are traditionally an opportunity for allies to show a common front against security challenges, but the aforementioned tension in transatlantic ties risks jeopardising this. Experts are concerned that distrust generated in the area of trade will seep into discussions and weaken consensus on the way ahead for NATO. They argue that the summit should move past the issue of burden sharing. Yet, as others point out, this age-old debate is expected to ‘reach a moment of reckoning this year’ leading to what is referred to as ‘strategic adjustment on a grand scale’ whereby the European allies will move towards investing more in defence capabilities. Further concern has been raised by the American president’s decision to meet Russian president Vladimir Putin in Helsinki shortly after the summit, on 16 July.

For some, much will much will depend on how President Trump decides to approach the summit, both publicly and privately, and on whether he will confirm the US unconditional commitment to NATO’s collective defence clause, regardless of the issue of defence budgets and burden sharing. In spite of his rhetoric, the Trump administration has so far supported the defence of Europe’s eastern flank through the European Deterrence Initiative which adds more than US$15 billion to NATO’s hard power. The US is also expected to outline its role for the new Atlantic command.

EU-NATO relations

With growing threats in Europe’s periphery, the summit will inevitably focus on boosting security in Europe, including through countering Russian aggression and tackling challenges related to the ongoing crises in the Middle East and North Africa. EU Member States are expected to reiterate the benefits for NATO of closer EU cooperation in the field of defence, such as PESCO, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and the European Defence Fund, and to downplay any concerns held by non-EU NATO members. In this respect, the expected EU-NATO joint statement will further solidify complementarity between the EU initiatives and NATO.

Regional focal points

Russia’s growing presence in the BIack Sea has led several think tanks to argue that the summit will be used to focus on NATO’s operations in the region, as well as on the role of the partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine. NATO’s Mediterranean partnerships should also come into the spotlight, as they are important in building defence capacity, as should the potential NATO training mission in Iraq. A ‘hub’ for the south was recently established at Joint Force Command in Naples. NATO leaders are also likely to open accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Russia represents the most pressing and, according to the Heritage Foundation, ‘existential’ threat to NATO members; the effort to build up deterrence measures is explicitly in response to Russia. For the American conservative think tank, a united and robust response to Russia should be the major outcome of the summit. In the same vein, Chatham House experts argue that tensions among allies should not get in the way of dealing with Russia, and offer several recommendations in this vein, including a focus on the Arctic and the Black Sea; making progress in the areas of military mobility and situational awareness; and updating the 2011 NATO maritime strategy. Concrete actions aside, however, according to experts from the German Marshall Fund, ‘it is not the military deliverables from the Brussels summit that will be key for deterring Russia; what is paramount is unity among the allies, and especially transatlantic unity’.

Main references

Anxious anticipation ahead of NATO Brussels summit, German Marshall Fund, July 2018.

Counting dollars or measuring value. Assessing NATO and partner burden sharing, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2018.

Download this briefing on “2018 NATO summit: A critical time for European defence” in PDF.

Source Article from https://epthinktank.eu/2018/07/11/2018-nato-summit-a-critical-time-for-european-defence/